[wvns] Hamas From Within: Book Review
Tamimi discusses the philosophical underpinnings of the Hamas movement
and the discussion that takes place within Hamas itself concerning its
goals and means.
Hamas: A History From Within - Book Review
Jim Miles
http://palestinechronicle.com/story-08290744027.htm
Azzam Tamimi. Hamas: A History From Within. (Northampton : Olive
Branch Press, 2007)
Most of the world knows the superficial history of Hamas as presented
by western media, the stories of the suicide bombers, the election
results that were argued to be a vote against the PLO/Fatah but not
for Hamas, the resulting denial of that democratic vote by all western
governments, and most recently, the Hamas takeover of the
dysfunctional governance of the Gaza Strip. Azzam Tamimi's book,
Hamas; A History From Within, presents a much broader and much more
accurate perspective on a group that has had much more significance
for the Palestinian people than simply being a militant suicidal
terrorist group.
Consistent with the title, Tamimi presents a history that shows Hamas'
development from its roots within the Muslim Brotherhood, from its
aspects of international cooperation and denial, and from "within"
the development of the ideas, policies, and implementation of ideas
that is rarely seen in western media sources. It is not a fawning
sycophantic review, as it also reveals the internal struggles within
Hamas between the various people and political institutions involved
in its history and development, and further reveals the precarious
hold it had on survival, a survival that became ensured only with the
advent of more serious Israeli atrocities during the first Intifada.
Arguments have been made that Hamas was assisted in its set-up by
Israel in order to counter the power of the PLO/Fatah organization.
Tamimi is much more nuanced in his discussion of this, arguing more
that Israeli ignorance of what Hamas embodied and what it meant to the
mostly poorer and refugee Palestinians allowed it to survive without
direct complicity. Beginning with Sheikh Yassin in Gaza, and as a
reaction to the defeat of pan-Arabic Nasirism after the 1967 war, the
Islamic Brotherhood centred their concerns not on militancy, but
"primarily on instilling Islamic values and ethics in the hearts and
minds of the young." At that time, Israel did not support the Islamic
Brotherhood (Ikhwan) but the "occupation authorities did not object to
this seemingly benign religious activity." Tamimi argues, "At this
time, the Palestinian Ikhwan"; were concerned principally with the
education and training of their members and supporters so as to shield
them from what they deemed to be alien and hostile ideologies and
sociopolitical trends rescuing] the individual, the family, and the
community as a whole from the onslaught of Western ideas, whether
liberal or Marxist." An Islamic education and revival of Islamic
society, and not militant terrorism, were the initial forces behind
Ikhwan activities.
Following from that, and with full evidence over the years, the
Ikhwan, focussed mainly on students and young people, focussed on
providing social, recreational, and educational services. Again, "The
Israelis did not see this association [the Islamic Society] as any
kind of threat, and granted the Ikhwan a license for its
establishment." The activities of the society "included sports,
recreational trips, scouting activities, and public lectures on
religious and social issues."
There is certainly room to spin these developments into that of
Israeli subterfuge against the PLO, and more than likely within the
broad spectrum of opinion that is usual in all possible political
motivations that view could arise within some individuals, but
Tamimi's overall historical development indicates, as above, that
Israel simply saw it as no threat to themselves at that time.
Likewise, within the Ikhwan, would be individuals that were more
militantly oriented than others, but the fundamental appears solid and
well argued, that education and social services were the primary goal
of the original Ikhwan set-up. This led to the development of mosques,
schools, kindergartens, universities, day-care, medical clinics,
hospitals, and other social organizations. These organizations
obviously greatly benefited the poor and the refugees within the West
Bank and Gaza; in contrast, the PLO/Fatah, as evidenced in this work
and other recent histories, became more concerned about supporting
their own internal structures and maintaining their power and
predominance politically and economically over the Palestinian
territories.
As history from "within" Tamimi concentrates most of his presentation
on the personalities and politicians that influenced the development
of the Ikhwan into what became known as Hamas. Sheikh Ahmad Yassin was
the foremost among them, a spiritual and moral leader who oversaw the
major developments of the group, and who served as spiritual leader in
absentia during his many years in Israeli prisons. Other less familiar
names play major roles in the many developments both for and against
Hamas, Khalid Mishal, Abu Marzuq, Samih al-Battikhi, Ibrahim Ghosheh,
Isma'il Haniyah, Jordan's King Abdullah, and many others illustrate
the political turmoil that Hamas experienced over the years. The
international role played "within" Hamas is also reviewed, with its on
and off relationship with what I could only label as the
conspiratorial monarchy of Jordan significantly displayed.
Hamas' relationships with other Arab states, many of which appeared
self-serving for the Arab states, is well outlined, with the ultimate
support coming with the release of Sheikh Yassin in 1997 after the
disastrous (for the Jordanians) botched Mishal assassination attempt.
Yassin's Arabic tour the next year demonstrated high level political
support from his Arab neighbours (except those overly influenced by
his political rival Arafat) as well as the continuing strong support
from the Arab populations. This support came from "the movement&
amp;rsquo;s steadfastness in recent years in the face of an
American-led global campaign against it. In the face of would-be
crushing blows, Hamas had refused to modify its stance in the
slightest towards compliance." In Palestine, Hamas leaders were noted
for "ascetism, altruism, dedication, and honesty," for living with and
among the people as they always had, as "no one joins Hamas to make
money or has become rich by virtue of their position within it".
Finally, donors were aware that only a small fraction of the money
raised by Hamas would be used for military purposes." This stands in
contrast to the PLO/Fatah activities. The internal relationship of
Hamas with the PLO/Fatah becomes more intense as events progress, the
comparison between the two also drawing significant support towards
Hamas. Tamimi, as with other recent Palestinian histories [1] is quite
direct in his criticism of the PLO/Fatah who dominated the Palestinian
Authority whose "officials were seen to be paid unreasonably high
sums" as well as being employed "in the expanding security services,
whose task was to control the occupied Palestinians on behalf of Israel."
This "vast bureaucracy" secured the loyalty of its employees "and
served to increase the disparity of economic means between
Palestinians." Fatah suffered from "a plague of rampant corruption"
and was "wracked by corrosive rivalries that sickened many Palestinians."
The transition from being a section of the Islamic Brotherhood, the
Ikhwan, into Hamas began before the start of the first Intifada.
Internal discussion had taken place about armed resistance, with the
Ikhwan maintaining that building the Islamic individual and community
were paramount. From these discussions developed the movement towards
protest actions, and a more militant viewpoint that found expression
with the Intifada, dated as of December 8, 1987. The Intifada "was a
gift from heaven" for Hamas, with the PLO and Israel being caught off
guard. The Israelis misjudged it in two aspects: that it was "Merely
an expression of anger that would abate in a day or two" and they
"were not sure who was orchestrating the unrest."
The results of the Intifada were counterproductive for Israel as they
"were oblivious to the fact the whenever they hit Hamas, and no matter
how hard they hit it, they only earned it further popular sympathy and
support." With the PLO leaders at this time still encamped in Tunis,
it was these actions that Tamimi credits "to the emergence of Hamas as
a credible alternative to the PLO."
Through all this the Hamas military wing developed, the al-Qassam
Brigades, "a product of the intifada itself." With their organization
involving an "inside" and "outside" leadership, and the recognition
that Israel would try to decapitate that leadership, "Hamas "seemed to
make gains out of its losses."
From that time, Hamas history became public, with the western media
emphasizing the Islamic militancy of the al-Qassam Brigade above the
overall Hamas political set-up. From that, as is well known, Hamas has
been declared a terrorist organization by many countries even though
it is much more similar to all other insurgencies worldwide against
foreign occupation. [2]
Eventually, through all the intervening activities, Tamimi summarizes,
"From Israel's unconditional and unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon to
its unconditional and unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, it was Hamas
that reaped the benefits and emerged victorious despite the losses.
The failure of peace negotiations, whether the Oslo Accords, the road
map, or Sharon's disengagement policy, seemed in the eyes of many
Palestinians to vindicate Hamas's approach."
History then takes the story in a new direction as Hamas buys into the
political process. This part of the story is much better known to the
west, albeit similarly biased in its presentation of Hamas as a
terrorist group. Although winning a clear majority of the Palestinian
legislative seats, an accomplishment that Tamimi sees not as a vote
against the PLO as "in reality, only a fraction of the votes cast was
made up of protest votes," the election was universally disallowed and
has resulted in ongoing internal division within the Palestinian
territories, with now PLO leader Abbas being the current
Israeli/American "man of peace" while being derided alternately as
another PLO pawn in their hands. The PLO, Israel, America and the
west in general have done as much as possible to discredit and destroy
the Hamas political success.
While discussing these recent events, Tamimi also discusses more of
the philosophical underpinnings of the Hamas movement and the
discussion that takes place within Hamas itself concerning its goals
and means. The Hamas charter "reads more like an internal circular"
and there is ongoing discussion about writing a new charter. In
Appendix II, Tamimi presents a memo prepared by the Hamas Political
Bureau in 2000 that is a much more nuanced document, and it still
calls for "naturally - the liberation of Palestine, and supports its
right to military resistance (as a right determined under
international law as well). In the chapter "The Liberation Ideology of
Hamas" Tamimi develops these internal discussion as well as adding
more definition to other ideas presented in passing in western media.
The idea of "hudna" or truce receives strong coverage (including
previous statements that only Hamas had ever initiated and maintained
a unilateral truce during the various conflicts), as well as "tahdi'"
or calming, a temporary "hudna." The result of these truces however
was that "Israel's refusal to reciprocate led many Palestinians to
lose confidence in the usefulness of declaring a unilateral truce."
The concept of suicide and suicide bombing within the Islamic context
as well as within western perception is discussed, along with the
related Islamic discussions of jihad and its subordinate positions
"qital" and martyrdom.
For those in the west who truly want to understand Hamas, Hamas A
History From Within should be required reading (along with those
mentioned in the footnotes). It is clearly written, presents well
structured arguments and while it is a history, it is much more than
dates, names, and events, but a running discussion of the changes in
ideas and organizational structures within Hamas.
Although the Israelis and Americans use their own "terrorist theology"
to denounce Hamas the reality as seen by the Palestinians is one of
colonial occupation and subjugation with the intent, ultimately, of
Israeli hegemony over the Palestinian territories as well as the
greater Middle East, supported in full by American commercial/military
interests. Azzam Tamimi has presented a highly informative work, one
that provides a significant new perspective for the west on what is
occurring in Palestine and the Middle East.
Notes
[1] see in particular Between the Lines, by Honig-Parnass and Haddad,
Haymarket Books, 2007, and The Palestinian Hamas by Mishal and Sela,
Columbia University Press, 2006. While they all direct criticism at
the PLO/Fatah, they also recognize the contributions made towards
recognition of the Palestinian situation internationally and the
powerful unifying symbolism of Arafat, particularly when he defied
Israel at the end of his time in Ramallah.
[2] Nor did Hamas originate suicide bombings of civilians. Yes, that
is terror, but it is also an ‘asy mmetrical’ response to
massive oppression endured under occupation and the terror that
devolves from Israeli and American military actions against
Palestinian civilians. For a reasoned discussion on suicide bombing,
see Dying To Win, by Robert Pape, Random House, 2005.-Jim Miles is a
Canadian educator and a regular contributor/columnist of opinion
pieces and book reviews to Palestine Chronicle. His interest in this
topic stems originally from an environmental perspective, which
encompasses the militarization and economic subjugation of the global
community and its commodification by corporate governance and by the
American government.
*********************************************************************
WORLD VIEW NEWS SERVICE
To subscribe to this group, send an email to:
wvns-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
NEWS ARCHIVE IS OPEN TO PUBLIC VIEW
http://finance.groups.yahoo.com/group/wvns/
Need some good karma? Appreciate the service?
Please consider donating to WVNS today.
Email ummyakoub@yahoo.com for instructions.
To leave this list, send an email to:
wvns-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
Yahoo! Groups Links
<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/wvns/
<*> Your email settings:
Individual Email | Traditional
<*> To change settings online go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/wvns/join
(Yahoo! ID required)
<*> To change settings via email:
mailto:wvns-digest@yahoogroups.com
mailto:wvns-fullfeatured@yahoogroups.com
<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
wvns-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
No comments:
Post a Comment