[wvns] Two Of Seven Op-Ed Soldiers Die In Iraq
Two Of Seven Soldiers Who Wrote New York Times Op-Ed Die In Iraq
On Aug. 19, seven active duty soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division
wrote an op-ed in The New York Times called " The War As We Saw It."
The piece expressed skepticism about "recent press coverage portraying
the conflict as increasingly manageable":
The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in
Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered
framework. […]
In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released
Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of
their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain
dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and force
our withdrawal. […]
We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see
this mission through.
On Monday, two of these soldiers — Sgt. Omar Mora and Sgt. Yance Gray
— died in a vehicle accident in Western Baghdad. The news of their
deaths came as Gen. David Petraeus wrapped up his testimony to
Congress about the Bush administration's progress in Iraq.
The soldiers' courage to speak out has helped change the debate. In
yesterday's Senate hearing, Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) read from the
soldiers' op-ed. Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-NE) also referenced the op-ed,
challenging Petraeus's rosy assessments:
HAGEL: By the way, I assume you read the New York Times piece two
weeks ago — seven NCOs in Iraq, today, finishing up 15 month
commitments. Are we going to dismiss those seven NCOs? Are they
ignorant? They laid out a pretty different scenario, General,
Ambassador, from what you're laying out today.
Mora's stepfather said that Mora believed the "situation in Iraq was
desperate " and was sad that children in Iraq were "having to live"
with the war going on. His mother said that Mora, who was on his
second tour of duty, was supposed to be coming home in November.
Mora is survived by his wife, Christa, and 5-year-old daughter, Jordan
. Gray is survived by his wife, Jessica, and infant daughter, Ava .
One of the other five authors, Staff Sgt. Jeremy Murphy, was shot in
the head while the article was being written. He is expected to recover.
===
The Iraq war as we see it
Seven U.S. soldiers speak
August 19, 2007
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/19/opinion/ediraq.php
BAGHDAD: Viewed from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment,
the political debate in Washington is surreal.
Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents
and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To
believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived
its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population
and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched.
As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd
Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent
press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and
feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest
we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should
not be seen as official within our chain of command.)
The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in
Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered
framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are
offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the "battle space"
remains the same, with changes only at the margins.
It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni
extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and
armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable
loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army,
which have been trained and armed at U.S. taxpayers' expense.
A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American
soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal
armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army
checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to
American investigators that Iraqi police and army officers escorted
the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted
their own predicament: Had they informed the Americans of the bomb
before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite
militia would have killed their families.
As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports
that a majority of Iraqi army commanders are now reliable partners can
be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion
commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the
thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of
command, who are really loyal only to their militias.
Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi
armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our
tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have
against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form
their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.
However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a
counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the
center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become
effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their
loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself
working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is
justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the
Americans leave.
In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies
and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground
remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this
fact became all too clear: One of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, a U.S.
Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head
during a "time-sensitive target acquisition mission" on August 12; he
is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in
the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight
in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the
ground require measures we will always refuse - namely, the widespread
use of lethal and brutal force.
Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an
American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers
to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a
resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of
the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we
take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel
increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has
failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly
unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.
Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet
political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass
in the government has fueled confusion while providing no semblance of
security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting
political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting
political solution will not be possible while the military situation
remains in flux.
The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the
Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority
members. The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make
sure its people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920:
rebelling against the British and losing what they believed was their
inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The qualified and
reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the invasion has
to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us something useful
for the moment.
Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they
believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how
best to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without
consolidation risks losing it all. Washington's insistence that the
Iraqis correct the three gravest mistakes we made - de-Baathification,
the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose
federalist system of government - places us at cross purposes with the
government we have committed to support.
Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence
or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms
when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the
political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please
every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers.
The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying
to please every party - as we do now - will only ensure we are hated
by all in the long run.
The most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic
social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed
most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering
countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now
fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone
services and sanitation. "Lucky" Iraqis live in communities barricaded
with concrete walls that provide them with a sense of communal
claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider
normal. In an environment where men with guns rule the streets,
engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act.
Four years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while
we have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist,
militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of
average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can
hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us
a few days ago with deep resignation, "We need security, not free food."
In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released
Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of
their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain
dignity is to call us what we are - an army of occupation - and force
our withdrawal.
Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let
Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced
policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve
their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be
defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible
policies to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.
We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see
this mission through.
Buddhika Jayamaha is a U.S. Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a
sergeant. Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant.
Edward Sandmeier is a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant.
Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff sergeant.
*********************************************************************
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