[wvns] Plans for disintegrating Pakistan

Plans for disintegrating Pakistan are now up for debate.
Abid Ullah Jan
http://www.dictatorshipwatch.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=2672&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0

Frederick Kagan and Michael O'Hanlon presented their strategic plan
for disarming Pakistan in the New York Time on November 19, 2007.
Written with imperial arrogance and colonial mindset, this piece
cannot be contemptuously dismissed because the duo is a respected pair
of neocons. O'Hanlon is the cheerleader of surge in Iraq and with
Brookings and New York Times standing behind them, there is good
reason for Pakistanis and their corrupt leadership to wake up.

This back-of-an-envelope military planning from neocon analysts is
part of the plan under which support is extended to dictatorial and
corrupt regimes in Pakistan so that it could lead to chaos and
anarchy, and the way is paved for an invasion and neutralization of
the military power of Pakistan. The objective remains the same as it
was in the case of a wars on Iraq and the plans for a war on Iran.
Only the strategy for neutralising the military power of Pakistan is
different.

The plan is published in the NY Times with the intention to garner
unwarranted attention. For one thing, since the White House regards
the Surge as a stunning success, it's natural that Kagan and O'Hanlon
will receive a sympathetic ear.

And though their counsel is singularly lacking in rational approach
and denies the right to self defense and self determination to yet
another nation, a president with little interest in the rights and
freedom is unlikely to notice its absence.

Kegan and O'Hanlon don't have a plan other then the dream of American
military salvation through collaborators and traitors referred to in
the op-ed as pro-America moderates. In their rumination, presented a s
a plan, the duo says: "Given the degree to which Pakistani
nationalists cherish these assets, it is unlikely the United States
would get permission to destroy them. Somehow, American forces would
have to team with Pakistanis to secure critical sites and possibly to
move the material to a safer place." What kind of Pakistanis are they
expecting to team up with the invading armies?

In their wishful thinking the authors of the plan for invasion of
Pakistan assume that Pakistan's military will be totally in favor of
the invasion and support the invading armies: "So, if we got a large
number of troops into the country, what would they do? The most likely
directive would be to help Pakistan's military and security forces
hold the country's center — primarily the region around the capital,
Islamabad, and the populous areas like Punjab Province to its south."

The plan is not sure how American forces will be welcomed by Pakistan
army, but says "somehow" the invading armies "would have to team up
with Pakistanis." Somehow is how in search of a plan. However, that is
not a matter for concern for warlords in the US and other Western
capitals who believe as long as the objective is clear (target
Pakistan's nuclear power), the how aspect will be taken care of
somehow. However, we know from the Us experience of mass killings to
the level of genocide in Iraq that it is not always as simple to
invade a country as easily and these warmongers present.

Of course there are sellouts everywhere and the greedy and opportunist
Pakistani generals may already have revealed the locations of critical
sites to their overbearing American masters. Still the scenario of
invasion and capturing the prized weapons would not be as simple as we
read in the pages of the New York Times. No matter what the sold-out
generals may have done at the top level, the idea that the Pakistani
military as a whole will cooperate or any faction within it would in
effect hand over the prize jewels of Pakistan's national defense for
American safekeeping — even if that was in "a remote redoubt within
Pakistan" — is laughable.

The junior officers have no option but to obey their commanders at the
top. However, when they realize that their top leadership is colluding
with the United States for invading Pakistan and destroying of
removing its nuclear weapons, the revolution/revolt in Pakistan army
would be nothing less than hell for a few generals at the top. The US
warmongers might see up in smoke all the military discipline we see
now. They might see the traitors hanged in the streets in Pakistan.
There can be little doubt that American officials have already been
provided with multiple assurances that the Generals command is the
last command and everyone else down the ranks will obey. However there
is no guarantee that the thousands of juniors officers would remain
loyal even when they see the writing on the wall.

As David Sanger and William Broad noted in the New York Times (Nov 18,
2007) a U.S. sponsored, post-9/11 plan to safeguard Pakistan's nuclear
weapons, "has been hindered by a deep suspicion among Pakistan's
military that the secret goal of the United States was to gather
intelligence about how to locate and, if necessary, disable Pakistan's
arsenal, which is the pride of the country."

So, it would seem that while Washington indulges in hair brain schemes
for safeguarding Pakistani nukes, Pakistan's military is not as
concerned about the myth of these weapons falling into the hands of
militants as they are fearful of America using Pakistan's engineered
instability as a ruse for implementing a unilateral disarmament scheme.

Kagan and O'Hanlon, sensing that pro-American Pakistanis might be in
short supply, have nevertheless devised a Plan B — sort of. This one
requires, "a sizable combat force — not only from the United States,
but ideally also other Western powers and moderate Muslim nations."
The American warlords are confident that the "longstanding
effectiveness of Pakistan's security forces," will provide sufficient
time for a U.S.-led coalition to be deployed. They must remember that
no "moderate Muslim" state came to help the US in its war for chemical
and biological weapons in Iraq. How and from where would they come to
the rescue of the Islamophobic allies in the case of a new war on a
nuclear armed Muslim state?

Now we get to the really interesting passage, indicating that the Iraq
war supporters have made great progress on the Middle East plan in
which Pakistan is also divided with parts of it going to Afghanistan
and the emergence of an independent Baluchistan: "…if we got a large
number of troops into the country, what would they do? The most likely
directive would be to help Pakistan's military [assuming it is working
with the invaders] and security forces hold [just] the country's
center — primarily the region around the capital, Islamabad,
[Pakistan's Green Zone ] and the populous areas like Punjab Province
to its south. [Leaving Baluchistan, NWFP and Sindh alone for redrawing
the new Middle East map, which interestingly included South Asia as
well. See Ralph Peters, Armed Forces Journal - June 2006 ]

The war rhetoric surrounds the slogans that the "task of retaking any
such regions and reclaiming custody of any nuclear weapons would be a
priority for our troops." Hoever, the reality conceded by the authors
is telling. They are simply bringing the grand design for undermining
Pakistan – of which supporting tyrannical rule in Pakistan was one of
the key components for seeding crisis and chaos - to the forefront for
discussion and consensus building. Now all those Democrats who said
Iraq was a distraction from the war on terrorism will be forced on
board. Who could guess a few years ago that an engineered, chaotic
fall of Musharraf would provide such a golden opportunity to the
warlords in Washington?

In the plans of American warlords, the time for Pakistan is up. It is
up to Pakistan's religious, military and political "leaders," who have
facilitated the neocons plans thus far, to take a note of the
impending war on Pakistan, make necessary course corrections, or get
ready to be decimated with the rest of their countrymen or hanged in
the streets in case they survive the shock and awe.

Abid Ullah Jan is the author of The Musharraf Factor: Leading Pakistan
to its Inevitable Demise.

===

US Hopes to Recruit Pakistani Tribes Against al-Qaeda
By Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti and Carlotta Gall
The New York Times
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/111907J.shtml

Washington - A new and classified American military proposal
outlines an intensified effort to enlist tribal leaders in the
frontier areas of Pakistan in the fight against Al Qaeda and the
Taliban, as part of a broader effort to bolster Pakistani forces
against an expanding militancy, American military officials said.

If adopted, the proposal would join elements of a shift in
strategy that would also be likely to expand the presence of American
military trainers in Pakistan, directly finance a separate tribal
paramilitary force that until now has proved largely ineffective and
pay militias that agreed to fight Al Qaeda and foreign extremists,
officials said. The United States now has only about 50 troops in
Pakistan, a Pentagon spokesman said, a force that could grow by dozens
under the new approach.

The proposal is modeled in part on a similar effort by American
forces in Anbar Province in Iraq that has been hailed as a great
success in fighting foreign insurgents there. But it raises the
question of whether such partnerships, to be forged in this case by
Pakistani troops backed by the United States, can be made without a
significant American military presence in Pakistan. And it is unclear
whether enough support can be found among the tribes, some of which
are working with Pakistan's intelligence agency.

Altogether, the broader strategic move toward more local support
is being accelerated because of concern about instability in Pakistan
and the weakness of the Pakistani government, as well as fears that
extremists with havens in the tribal areas could escalate their
attacks on allied troops in Afghanistan. Just in recent weeks, Islamic
militants sympathetic to Al Qaeda and the Taliban have already
extended their reach beyond the frontier areas into more settled
areas, most notably the mountainous region of Swat.

[The Pakistani president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, recommended late
Sunday that the Election Commission call for parliamentary elections
on Jan. 8, but he did not say whether emergency rule would be revoked
beforehand, Reuters reported early Monday.

"Inshallah, the general elections in the country would be held on
Jan. 8," the official Associated Press of Pakistan news agency quoted
Musharraf as saying late Sunday.]

The tribal proposal, a strategy paper prepared by staff members of
the United States Special Operations Command, has been circulated to
counterterrorism experts but has not yet been formally approved by the
command's headquarters in Tampa, Fla. Some other elements of the
campaign have been approved in principle by the Americans and
Pakistanis and await financing, like $350 million over several years
to help train and equip the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force that
has about 85,000 members and is recruited from border tribes.

Ever since Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush administration has used
billions of dollars of aid and heavy political pressure to encourage
Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president, to carry out more
aggressive military operations against militants in the tribal areas.
But the sporadic military campaigns Pakistan has conducted there have
had little success, resulting instead in heavy losses among Pakistani
Army units and anger among local residents who have for decades been
mostly independent from Islamabad's control.

American officials acknowledge those failures, but say that the
renewed emphasis on recruiting allies among the tribal militias and
investing more heavily in the Frontier Corps reflect the depth of
American concern about the need to address Islamic extremism in
Pakistan. The new counterinsurgency campaign is also a vivid example
of the American military's asserting a bigger role in a part of
Pakistan that the Central Intelligence Agency has overseen almost
exclusively since Sept. 11.

Small numbers of United States military personnel have served as
advisers to the Pakistani Army in the tribal areas, giving planning
advice and helping to integrate American intelligence, said one senior
American officer with long service in the region.

Historically, American Special Forces have gone into foreign
countries to work with local militaries to improve the security of
those countries in ways that help American interests. Under this new
approach, the number of advisers would increase, officials said.

American officials said these security improvements complemented a
package of assistance from the Agency for International Development
and the State Department for the seven districts of the tribal areas
that amounted to $750 million over five years, and would involve work
in education, health and other sectors. The State Department's Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is also
assisting the Frontier Corps with financing for counternarcotics work.

Some details of the security improvements have been reported by
The Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post. But the classified
proposal to enlist tribal leaders is new.

"The D.O.D. is about to start funding the Frontier Corps," one
military official said, referring to the Department of Defense. "We
have only got a portion of that requested but it is enough to start."

Until now, the Frontier Corps has not received American military
financing because the corps technically falls under the Pakistani
Interior Ministry, a nonmilitary agency that the Pentagon ordinarily
does not deal with. But American officials say the Frontier Corps is
in the long term the most suitable force to combat an insurgency. The
force, which since 2001 has increasingly been under the day-to-day
command of Pakistani Army units, is now being expanded and trained by
American advisers, diplomats said.

The training of the Frontier Corps remains a concern for some.
NATO and American soldiers in Afghanistan have often blamed the
Frontier Corps for aiding and abetting Taliban insurgents mounting
cross-border attacks. "It's going to take years to turn them into a
professional force," said one Western military official. "Is it worth
it now?"

At the same time, military officials fear the assistance to
develop a counterinsurgency force is too little, too late. "The
advantage is already in the enemy hands," one Western military
official said. Local Taliban and foreign fighters in Waziristan have
managed to regroup since negotiating peace deals with the government
in 2005 and 2006, and last year they were able to fight all through
the winter, he said. Militants have now emerged in force in the Swat
area, a scenic tourist region that is a considerable distance inland
from the tribal areas on the border.

The planning at the Special Operations Command intensified after
Adm. Eric T. Olson, a member of the Navy Seals who is the new head of
the command, met with General Musharraf and Pakistani military leaders
in August to discuss how the military could increase cooperation in
Pakistan's fight against the extremists.

A spokesman for the command, Kenneth McGraw, would not comment on
any briefing paper that had been circulated for review. He said Friday
that after Admiral Olson returned from his trip, he "energized the
staff to look for ways to develop opportunities for future cooperation."

A senior Defense Department official said that Admiral Olson had
prepared a memorandum on how Special Operations forces could assist
the Pakistani military in the counterinsurgency, and shared that
document with several senior Pentagon officials.

Four senior defense or counterterrorism officials confirmed that
planning was under way at the command headquarters.

One person who was briefed on the proposal prepared by the Special
Operations Command staff members, and who spoke on condition of
anonymity because the briefing had not yet been approved, said it was
in the form of about two dozen slides. The slides described a strategy
using both military and nonmilitary measures to fight the militants.

One slide included a chart that categorized one to two dozen
tribes by location - North Waziristan and South Waziristan, for
example - and then gave a brief description of their location, their
known or suspected links to Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and their size
and military abilities.

The briefing said United States forces would not be involved in
any conventional combat in Pakistan. But several senior military and
Pentagon officials said elements of the Joint Special Operations
Command, an elite counterterrorism unit, might be involved in strikes
against senior militant leaders under specific conditions.

Two people briefed on elements of the approach said it was modeled
in part on efforts in Iraq, where American commanders have worked with
Sunni sheiks in Anbar Province to turn locals against the militant
group Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the homegrown Sunni extremist group
that American intelligence agencies say is led by foreigners.

The success of these efforts, together with the consensus in
military and intelligence circles that the grip of the original Al
Qaeda in the tribal areas continues to tighten at a time when the
Pakistani government is in crisis, led planners at the Special
Operations Command to develop the strategy for the tribal areas.

A group of Pakistan experts convened in March by the Defense
Intelligence Agency concluded that empowering tribal leaders could be
an effective strategy to counter the rising influence of Islamic
religious leaders and to weaken Al Qaeda. But a report on the session
found that such successes "would be difficult to achieve, particularly
in the north (Bajaur) and south (North and South Waziristan)."

One person who had been brief on the proposal cautioned that
whether a significant number of tribal leaders would join an
American-backed effort carried out by Pakistani forces was "the
$64,000 question."

--------

Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti reported from Washington, and
Carlotta Gall from Islamabad, Pakistan.

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