[wvns] Sara Roy Censored from Academic Journal
BOOK REVIEW
Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad by
Matthew Levitt. Yale University Press, in cooperation with the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006. 324 pages, $26.00,
hardcover.
Sara Roy
Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University
http://mepc.org/journal_vol14/0707_roy.asp
Author's Note:
This review, published here in its entirety, was originally
commissioned by The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, the official
foreign-policy journal at the Fletcher School at Tufts University.
Between the time I was invited to write the review and the time I was
told it would be published, over two months had passed during which I
had had several exchanges, some of them difficult, with the editorial
staff. However, by the end of the process the editor-in-chief, with
whom I had been working, was pleased with the review, and so was I. He
sent me an e-PDF of the review as it would appear in the journal
(Volume 31:1 Winter 2007). The PDF version of the page proofs revealed
that the editor had excerpted two relevant sentences (featured in
sidebars) to highlight observations that I had offered in the review:
1. "While there can be no doubt that, since its inception, Hamas has
engaged in violence and armed struggle, and has been the primary force
behind the horrific suicide bombings inside Israel, Levitt's
presentation reduces this increasingly complex and sophisticated
organization to an insular, one-dimensional...entity dedicated solely
to violence...and Israel's destruction."
2. "The ability of Hamas to reinterpret itself over time through
processes of radicalization, de-radicalization, de-militarization, and
re-radicalization is a pronounced and common theme in its historical
evolution."
During a subsequent exchange the editor-in-chief wrote, "Thank you for
your hard work as well. It's a good review." I believed that was the
end of the matter. Just a few days later, I received the following
e-mail message from the same editor-in-chief:
Dear Ms. Roy:
…After careful review and much consideration of the merits of your
piece, we have decided that we are ultimately unable to publish your
review for this edition. Your review was evaluated by several of our
editors and an external editor for objectivity. Unfortunately, they
disagreed with my decision to publish your review for the following
reasons: despite their agreement with many of your points, all
reviewers found the piece one-sided. This one-sidedness dissuaded
readers from reading the piece to the end; ultimately, this last point
is the most important. Although I found your arguments valuable, if
readers consistently feel this way, I am unable to move forward with a
piece. My apologies for the way in which this process was carried out,
and for the time that you spent on editing the piece. Thank you once
again for your submission and your efforts. If you would like to
discuss this further, please feel free to e-mail me.
In more than 20 years of writing and publishing I have never
experienced such behavior or encountered what to me, at least, is so
blatant a case of censorship. I am therefore extremely grateful to
Anne Joyce and Stephen Magro for agreeing to publish the review in
Middle East Policy.
===
At the beginning of the first Palestinian uprising, I was living in
Gaza and spent much time in the refugee camps interviewing families
about the political and socioeconomic changes taking place around
them. Despite the harsh living situation, Palestinians were filled
with a palpable sense of hope and possibility that has since
evaporated. Hamas was then struggling to create a popular
constituency, despite overwhelming support among Palestinians for
secular nationalism. That was 18 years ago, and neither I nor anyone
else ever thought that Hamas would one day emerge as a major political
actor: democratically winning legislative elections, defeating the
majority Fatah party and heading a Palestinian government.
In his recent book, Matthew Levitt, who is deputy assistant secretary
for intelligence and analysis at the U.S. Department of the Treasury
and an expert in financial counterterrorism, argues that Hamas is
strictly a terrorist organization that is not only a domestic threat
but a global one, a part of an international jihad network with links
to al-Qaeda that must be met with force. He further argues — and this
is the core of his book — that despite the existence of differentiated
political, social and military sectors within Hamas, they are all part
of the same "apparatus of terror."
Levitt devotes significant attention to attacking the Islamist social
sector (dawa) and Hamas's charitable institutions. It is the principle
aim of his book to show how Hamas uses its extensive social-service
network-mosques, schools, kindergartens, orphanages, hospitals,
clinics, sports clubs, youth clubs-to further its primary political
agenda, which he claims is the destruction of Israel. He argues that
through its social support structure and services, "Hamas leverages
the appreciation (and indebtedness) it earns through social welfare
activities to garner support — both political and logistical — for its
terrorist activities." Levitt summarizes his argument as follows: "The
general deprivation of the Palestinian people in the Israeli-occupied
territories predisposes them to favor the much-needed social support
that Hamas provides." He continues, "In addition to purchasing
goodwill, charities also create a built-in logistical support umbrella
underneath which terrorist operations are sheltered and operate." He
explains that the dawa network operationally supports terrorism
through recruitment, employment and financing and by providing
institutional legitimacy.
His evidence, at times interesting, particularly with regard to
Hamas's external sources of financing, is more often than not based on
assumption, extrapolation and generalization. For example, as evidence
for how religious organizations raise money for Palestinian terrorism,
Levitt quotes from a pamphlet produced by a Quranic memorization
center that was sponsored by the Ramallah-al Bireh charity committee.
The pamphlet listed 30 ways to enter heaven, including "Jihad for the
sake of Allah by fighting with one's soul and money."
In another example of how hospitals are used to support terrorism,
Levitt briefly describes the Dar al-Salam Hospital: "According to
information cited by the FBI," the hospital is considered a Hamas
institution because it was founded with "Hamas funds and protection."
But Levitt fails to provide any real evidence of these funds or how
and why they are considered "Hamas." The assumption is that these
ties, even if they are shown to exist, are inherently evil and can be
nothing else.
In a chapter on how the dawa teaches terror and radicalizes
Palestinian society, Levitt writes, "Recipients of Hamas financial aid
or social services are less likely to turn down requests from the
organization such as allowing their homes to serve as safe houses for
Hamas fugitives, ferrying fugitives, couriering funds or weapons,
storing and maintaining explosives, and more." He cites as evidence
for this sweeping statement one resident of Jabalya refugee camp in
Gaza who fed Hamas militants daily. The possibility that Palestinians
receive support from Hamas institutions without preconditions or that
popular support requires more than the lure of financial incentives
and free social services does not enter Levitt's argument. Levitt also
claims, "When angry, frustrated or humiliated Palestinians regularly
listen to sermons in mosques in which Jews, Israelis and even
Americans are depicted as enemies of Islam and Palestine, Hamas's
official policy may not restrain individual enthusiasm." One wonders
how Mr. Levitt knows these things, given that he appears never to have
stepped inside a Hamas institution in Gaza or the West Bank or to have
conducted any fieldwork at all.
While these arguments are oft-repeated in today's media, Levitt does
little to address research that supports a very different conclusion
regarding the Hamas dawa. Some of the key findings of this research
point to institutional features that demonstrate no preference for
religion or politics over other ideologies, particularly in
programmatic work; an approach to institutional work that advocates
incrementalism, moderation, order and stability; a philosophical and
practical desire for productivity and professionalism that shuns
radical change and emphasizes community development and civic
restoration over political violence; and no evidence of any formal
attempt to impose an Islamic model of political, social, legal or
religious behavior, or to create an alternative Islamic or Islamist
conception of society.
While there can be no doubt that, since its inception, Hamas has
engaged in violence and armed struggle and has been the primary force
behind the horrific suicide bombings inside Israel, Levitt's
presentation reduces this increasingly complex and sophisticated
organization to an insular, one-dimensional and seemingly mindless
entity dedicated solely to violence, terrorism and Israel's
destruction. To fully understand the current political stature of
Hamas, it is necessary to closely examine the dramatic transitions
that have occurred within the organization itself, among Palestinians
with respect to their society, and in Palestine's relationship with
Israel.
From the point of view of Hamas, Palestine is an Arab and Islamic land
that fell to colonial control with the demise of the Ottoman Empire.
The establishment of the State of Israel is viewed as a way to
perpetuate colonial authority over the Muslim homeland and is
therefore illegitimate. As victims of colonialism, Hamas argues that
Palestinians have the right to resist and struggle to regain their
homeland and freedom, viewing this as a local and nationalist
struggle. Now, almost two decades after its birth, Hamas has grown in
size and popularity. While changes have not been made to its frame of
reference or objectives, its political discourse has become more
refined and streamlined, particularly with regard to its relations
with local groups, political factions, other religious communities and
other nations.
Unfortunately, Matthew Levitt's book does not address the critical
evolutionary processes — particularly with regard to its
organizational structure and political, social and economic role in
Palestinian society — that have characterized the Palestinian Islamist
movement and Hamas's rise to power. The ability of Hamas to
reinterpret itself over time through processes of radicalization,
de-radicalization, de-militarization and re-radicalization is a
pronounced and common theme in its historical evolution. Levitt
neglects to address the significance behind this commitment to
reinterpretation. His analysis aims simply to demonize Hamas, and he
discounts the critical connections between changing patterns of
protest and structures of society, competing visions of a Palestinian
social and political order, and contesting Islamic and secular
definitions of meaning and legitimacy. The synergy among these forces
has characterized the history and growth of Palestinian Islamism.
Israel's military occupation, which has long been the defining context
for Palestinian life, is almost absent from Levitt's book. Hamas's
popularity and growing empowerment derive from its role as a
resistance organization, fighting against an occupation that is now 40
years old. Israel's steady expropriation, fragmentation and division
of Palestinian lands; settlement construction and expansion; closure
restrictions and destruction of the Palestinian economy are not part
of Levitt's discussion, nor is the right of the Palestinians to resist
these measures. In those few instances where the occupation is
mentioned, it is couched in terms that acknowledge Palestinian
hardship — a reality exploited by Hamas — but justified as a response
to terrorism. In the absence of any serious examination of Israel's
occupation, Levitt's portrayal of the rise of Hamas is completely
detached from the context within which it was produced and shaped.
Despite evidence to the contrary, the organization is also described
as a movement incapable of transformation, ignoring the improvements
in Hamas's political discourse regarding political compromise with the
State of Israel and resolution of the conflict. During the period of
the Oslo peace process, for example, some dramatic changes occurred
within Hamas. The organization was moving away from the extreme and a
position of confrontation towards one that was more centrist and
moderate. This shift was characterized by a reorientation in policy
and strategic emphasis from political/military action to social works
and community development. Accompanying this shift was a redefinition
of the nature of the Palestinian struggle, which was no longer for
political or military power per se but for defining new social
arrangements and appropriate cultural and institutional models that
would meet social needs without resort to violence. Similarly, the
Islamist movement was not advancing a policy of isolation but was
calling for greater accommodation and cooperation with both domestic
and international actors.
Since Hamas's victory in the January 2006 legislative elections, there
has been a further evolution in its political thinking — as evidenced
in some of its key political documents — characterized by a strong
emphasis on state-building and programmatic work, greater refinement
with regard to its position on a two-state solution and the role of
resistance, and a progressive de-emphasis on religion. (See Khaled
Hroub, "A `New Hamas' Through Its New Documents," Journal of Palestine
Studies, 34 (4) (Summer 2006)). These are absent from Levitt's
discussion. Levitt also overlooks questions that are vital to any
analysis of Hamas, especially at present. To name just a few, what
were Hamas's ideological, philosophical and structural boundaries? How
and why were they reset and expanded? What is the role of religion as
opposed to politics in Islamist thought and practice, particularly in
the public sphere? Are religion and politics truly unified? Can Hamas
reconcile faith and ideology with a demand for a place in the
political system?
Levitt's book has many serious flaws and merits a detailed critique
that extends well beyond the scope of this review. His is not a work
of analysis or scholarship, to say the least, and despite certain
points that are interesting and accurate, anyone wishing to gain a
substantive, reasoned and critical understanding of Hamas would do
well to look elsewhere.
*********************************************************************
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