[wvns] Gilad Atzmon: The Hunters of Goliath
Gilad Atzmon reviews a new Israeli book on the last war and concludes:
For years we tended to believe that Israel would not be defeated in
the battlefield. Learning in detail the events of the last war allows
us to consider that this may not be the case. The Jewish state has
already been defeated in battle and this may happen again sooner than
we think.
Saying NO to the Hunters of Goliath
By Gilad Atzmon
http://peacepalestine.blogspot.com/2007/08/gilad-atzmon-saying-no-to-hunters-of.html
"A few reasons help to create the Nasrallah obsession (`dibuk'), that
influenced decision makers along the (Second Lebanon) war. Primarily,
Israel always perceived the Arab (leaders) as (private) people rather
than representatives of political systems. Even amongst media analysts
and politicians the references were pointing at "Assad", "Arafat" or
"Nasrallah" rather than the states and organisations they represent.
In the eyes of the (Israeli) decision-makers, as well as the media and
public, the Arab world was led by individuals rather than by
governmental systems and the best way to influence it was in most
cases to drop a bomb in the right place."
("Captives in Lebanon", Ofer Shelah and Yaov Limor)[1]
The Israelis tend to personalise conflicts. Yet, by doing this, they
are neither original nor innovative. They in fact follow a Biblical
lesson. Within the Judaic worldview, history and ethics are often
reduced into a banal single binary opposition principle. For instance,
the deadly battle between the `righteous' David and the `evil' Goliath
personalises the struggle between the `good' Israelites and the `bad'
Philistines. Though the Biblical specific tale could be understood in
a mere literary terms, the similarities to the Israelite of our time
are rather concerning. In Israel, there is a direct express path that
leads from the `role of the assassin' to the Government seat. Time
after time our contemporary Israelite supplicate their highly
decorated assassins to become their kings, to lead their army and then
to integrate into the cabinet. This obviously happened to Sharon,
Barak, Mofaz, Halutz, Dichter and many more.
However, Israelis are not alone here. The tendency to personalise and
concretise history is rather common amongst Jews. In the eyes of many
Jews the Third Reich is reduced into Hitler and Goebbels.
Anti-Semitism is often reduced into Wagner, Marx, Weininger and so on.
On the face of it, personification indeed simplifies the surrounding
reality, the course of history and its interpretation. Once Hitler is
gone, the Third Reich may be gone as well, once Wagner is banned, the
same may happen to anti-Semitism. This tendency to personalise
conflicts, ideologies and worldviews follows an infantile perception:
that which you no longer see may cease to exist. It fits as well with
the Biblical "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" paradigm.
Yet, it is nothing but a pattern of self-deception. It misleadingly
associates the abstract with some banal concretisation. It saves its
followers from any intellectual engagement with ideology, criticism or
self-reflection.
Clearly, the Zionist interpretation is engaged with nothing more than
the concrete symptom, with the simplest manifestation of the animosity
that surrounds it rather than with the core of the problem itself.
Hitler was indeed defeated, Jews are now more than welcome in Germany
and in Europe, yet, the Jewish state and the sons of Israel are at
least as unpopular in the Middle East as their grandparents were in
Europe just six decades ago. Seemingly, it is the personification of
WW2 and the Holocaust that blinded the Israelis and their supporters
from internalising the real meaning of the conditions and the events
that led towards their destruction in the first place. Would the
Zionists understand the real meaning of their Holocaust, the
contemporary Israelite may be able to prevent the destruction that may
be awaiting them in the future. Similarly, Wagner may be banned in
Israel, yet, the conditions that led Marx, Weininger and Wagner to say
what they had to say remain unchanged. As it seems, more and more
people in wider circles are now reacting critically, politically and
ideologically to Israel, Zionism, Jewish tribalism and the atrocious
inhuman policies that are implied by Jewish nationalism and its
political and cultural offshoots.
But let's face it, it isn't just the Israelis who personalise
conflicts. Thanks to the Neocons and their tremendous current
influence within the Anglo-American political realm, we are all
subject to some oversimplification and personalisation of almost every
Western conflict. Seemingly, every current Western war has a `face'
attached to it. The `war against terror' has the bearded face of Osama
Bin Laden. The alleged `liberation of the Iraqi people' had Saddam
Hussein's face on top of the `hit list'. Within the Neocon's Zionised
war, every ideological conflict becomes a personal `targeted
assassination' plot. May I remind us all that before Neocons launched
their pretty successful attempt to Zionise America and Britain, these
two countries were engaged in proper impersonalised ideological wars
and political conflicts. Britain and the USA fought courageously
against Third Reich Germany (rather than just against Hitler). They
coldly clashed with `The Reds' as well (rather than with just Stalin).
Clearly, this isn't the case anymore. Within a world shaped by
Neocons, the political system is reduced into a simplistic Biblical
Goliath chase. We the righteous, the Davids, pursue the Goliaths:
Saddam, Bin Laden, Assad, and Ahmadinejad.
However, by now we should all know how futile this philosophy is. As
much as Israel failed to defeat Palestinian resistance by killing
every noticeable emerging Palestinian leader, as much as Israel failed
to defeat the Hezbollah by aiming at its leadership, America and
Britain are doomed to fail in their current murderous Zionised
battles. Saddam is dead and yet, Iraq and its oil fields are still far
beyond reach. Bin Laden never shows his face in public and yet the war
against terror has yet to achieve a thing.
I want to believe that the emerging defeat of Israel and its
supporting lobbies will be appropriately grasped by the Western
public. We must say NO to Zionised tactics, we must say NO to Zionist
agents, we must say NO to the hunters of Goliath.
Anatomy of a Colossal Defeat
One year after the humiliating Israeli defeat in Lebanon I found
myself reviewing the Israeli fiasco through the eyes of two renowned
Israeli military analysts, Yoav Limor and Ofer Shelah. In a recent
book named `Captives Of Lebanon' the two have managed to assemble a
very detailed journal of the chain of events that led to the war, the
war itself and the endless lists of Israeli operational, tactical and
strategic failures. However, Limor and Shelah do not stop just with
the Army and its commanders, they skilfully convey an image of a
society that has lost its way, a society that has gradually become
detached from its own reality and from its surrounding environment. A
society that is facing total moral collapse, led by an egotistic,
self-centred leadership, both politically and militarily.
Israel's military defeat last year in Lebanon took the world by
surprise. It initially shocked Bush's Administration as well as Tony
Blair who were both very quick and keen to give Israel a green light
to destroy Lebanon's Shia leadership, not to mention obliterating
Lebanon's civilian infrastructure. Bush and Blair weren't the only
ones who came in for a shock, it also stunned the Arab world. Arab
leaders are not used to the defeat of the Israeli Army. Moderate Arab
leaders found themselves following the TV images in which a single
Muslim cleric was teaching Israelis what defiance was all about.
Seemingly, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah and an insignificant number of
warriors, proved to be the first Arabs to defeat the Israeli Army on
the ground. Their victory left Israel in shatters. The Israeli power
of deterrence disappeared completely. It became a subject for
historical research. The IDF Supreme Command was shocked as well: a
month after the war, General Udi Adam, the IDF Chief Commander of the
northern front, had resigned. It didn't take too long for Dan Halutz,
the IDF Chief of Staff, to follow his lead. Amir Peretz, the Minister
of Defence, was ousted by former PM Ehud Barak. It is rather clear
that the Israelis are fully aware of the scale of their defeat in
Lebanon. Yet, it seems as if the Israelis do not know how to amend the
damage. They are truly in love with their `good life', they are
captivated by the image of technology and wealth.
Though I am not so sure whether the book is going to be translated
into other languages (it is in Hebrew), I would classify this book as
a `must read' for anyone who is interested in the affairs of this
region. The book is a glimpse into Israeli society in what seems to be
its final dysfunctional yet destructive state. I am convinced that
those Americans who have been moronically sponsoring the Israeli death
apparatus for almost four decades, those who still believe that Israel
is a `regional super power' better read this journal of Israeli
military cowardice and general political malfunctioning.
Though the book wouldn't say it, the message is rather clear. Israel
operates as a megalomaniac violent Jewish ghetto motivated by some
bizarre murderous zeal flooded with American lethal technology. As
Limor and Shelah reveal, in spite of the fact that the conflict on the
ground took place on a very narrow strip of land (the Israeli border
on the south and Litani River on the north), the Israeli artillery had
managed to shoot over 170,000 shells. In comparison, in the 1973 war
while fighting against two strong state armies over two very large
fronts, the Israelis had launched only 53,000 shells. The figures
relating to the Air Force are even more striking. Though less than a
few concrete targets were available for the IDF intelligence, the IAF
(Israeli Air Force) had launched as many as 17,550 combat missions,
this translates into 520 missions a day, almost as many as in the 1973
war (605 a day). Yet, in 1973 the IAF was fighting two well-equipped
air forces, it was engaged in a fair amount of air-to-air combat and a
relentless struggle against the latest Soviet ground-to-air missiles.
None of that happened in the Second Lebanon War. The IAF was engaged
solely in hammering the Lebanese soil. It literally threw and launched
everything it had in its disposal, presenting a merciless method that
in places (southern Beirut for instance), had a similar effect to the
infamous 1940s Anglo-American carpet bombardment.
Why did the Israelis react so harshly to a local border incident? Why
did Israeli politicians and military chiefs lose their ability to
employ strategic and tactical considerations? Why did they all fail
to define achievable military goals, something that would give their
war a time frame, shape and justification? In short, why did the
Israelis lose their way? This is indeed a crucial question. Though
Limor and Shelah refrain from asking these questions, their book
manages to provide some answers. I will try to summarise some of their
points.
The Military
Let's start with the Army. The Israeli Army has undergone a serious
transition in the last four decades. In the years that followed the
rapid 1967 invasion, it was ground officers and tank brigadiers in
particular who were promoted to lead the Army. Post 1967 Israel
believed in Blitzkrieg, an offensive onslaught that simultaneously
puts into action some large ground forces together with close air
support. After the 1973 war, following the limited success of ground
forces and tank divisions, this trend has changed. Gradually, it was
the veterans of the Israeli special units who had been promoted to
high command positions. Probably the most famous among those veterans
was Ehud Barak, the highly decorated commando officer who ended his
military career as the IDF Chief of Staff. It was Barak who as Chief
of Staff appointed his ex subordinates for high positions in the
Israeli Supreme Command. Ground officers were pushed aside.
This transformation within the Israeli Army had two motivations behind
it: first, the intelligence assumption that not a single Arab state
would consider a total war against Israel in the near future; and
second, since the first Intifada and the general rise of Palestinian
civil resistance, the Israeli army found itself engaged in more and
more policing operations. Within such a shift there was not much need
for massive ground training. Tank and artillery brigades seemed to be
useless and even irrelevant to the newly emerging defence needs of the
Jewish state. Large units of combatant soldiers were diverted into
policing tasks in the West Bank and Gaza. Within the changing
scenario, it was initially Israeli special units and security chiefs
who took the lead in what the Israelis perceived as their `war against
terror'. Consequently, more and more Israeli commando veterans found
their way to the IDF high command and later straight into the highly
militarised Israeli political life.
But things didn't stop just there; it didn't take long before Israeli
special units failed to provide the solutions to what seemed to be a
constantly growing Palestinian civil resistance. Sending the salt of
the Jewish earth into Gaza in the wee hours proved to be too
dangerous. It must be told that as much as Israelis love to see their
young boys terrorising Palestinians, they cannot stand seeing their
beloved Rambos being ambushed and killed.
It was just a question of time before the Air Force was left to deal
with Palestinian defiance. Capitalising on some advanced American
technologies, Israel let its F-16s and Apache helicopter gunships
launch guided missiles against Palestinian civilian and military
targets. The philosophy was rather simple: the IAF was there to
maintain the Palestinians in a state of a constant awe. As it
happened, in the last decade, the IAF has become the leading force in
the war against Palestine, the Palestinian people and their imminent
Islamic leadership. The IAF was quick to develop a tactic that was
soon named `targeted assassination'. According to the new Israeli
military doctrine, all that was needed was some intelligence on the
ground, which would be followed by a single Israeli jet launching an
American guided missile in highly populated Gaza. The achievements
were rather clear. In many cases targeted Palestinians were
assassinated, in very many cases they found their death alongside
innocent civilian bystanders who were unlucky enough to be in the
proximity. These unfortunate people were in the wrong place at the
very wrong time. In many other cases the pilots just missed or were
misled by intelligence. As a result, many Palestinian civilians, old
people, women and children found their death. Clearly, no one in
Israel could care less. When Dan Halutz, still the IAF commander, was
asked how it feels to drop a bomb that kills fourteen Palestinian
civilians, his answer was short and simple. `It feels like a light
bounce on your left wing'. Halutz, the cold-blooded officer, the man
who ordered the murder of so many Palestinians, was the right man in
the right place, it didn't take long before he was asked to take the
lead of the Israeli Army.
As time went by, the Israeli government refrained from endangering
young Israeli soldiers. The Israeli `war against terror' has become
very safe warfare on the verge of a computer game. Sheik Yassin, Dr.
Rantisi and many other civilians fell victim to this form of murderous
tactic. Apparently, Israeli military leadership has been overwhelmed
with the success of their new killing method. The people of Israel had
a new God, namely `technological superiority'. The last Israeli wave
of generals, many of them pilots and special units' veterans, got
accustomed to the belief that Israel may maintain its regional supreme
power by capitalising on its technological superiority and
overwhelming firepower.
As Limor and Shelah reveal in their book, in the last decade Israeli
soldiers literarily stopped training of any form of large tactical
operations. With the IAF chasing the enemies of Israel in their
bedrooms, who needs tanks and artillery? Young Israeli tank drivers
were redeployed soon after their initial and minimal training into
elementary guard tasks in the occupied territories. In practice not
only were those soldiers foreign to their original military tasks in
tanks and artillery, they were not familiar at all with any form of
large operational tactical manoeuvres. In other words, as far as the
Israeli army is concerned, it lost its readiness to war.
So The Palestinians Actually Won
Many analysts regard the Palestinian resistance as a militarily futile
struggle. At the end of the day, not much harm can be inflicted by a
bunch of kids throwing stones. Reading Limor and Shelah may imply that
in reality, the Palestinian struggle was actually far from being
futile. In fact, it was precisely Palestinian civil resistance that
has managed to exhaust the Israeli army. It was the Palestinian
resistance that led the Israeli army into a state of paralysis. It was
the Palestinian resistance that stretched the IDF manpower to its
limit and stopped the Israeli army from training towards the `next
war'. It was the Palestinians who turned the Israeli soldiers and
their commanders into a bunch of cowards who prefer to win wars while
sitting in front of computer monitors moving joysticks. It was
actually the Palestinians who devastatingly dismantled the IDF
readiness for war.
It is very much as Sheik Hassan Nasrallah has been suggesting in one
of his most declamatory speeches. Israel was indeed `hiding behind
technological superiority just to cover its cowardice and
incomprehension of what the living in the Middle East may entail'[2].
The Israeli army has become used to smashing Palestinian civilians in
their homes, to murdering their emerging leadership, to terrorising
pregnant women in roadblocks, to shelling young kids in their school
classes, so this was indeed very easy. Yet, when the IDF was asked to
engage some tiny groups of lightly trained paramilitary enthusiasts,
it collapsed shamefully. It collapsed in spite of its technological
superiority; it was defeated in spite of its overwhelming firepower,
in spite of Bush's and Blair's disgraceful support. The Israeli Army
collapsed because it was incompetent, it was not ready to fight, it
did not know how to fight and most concerning for the Israelis, it
didn't even realise what it was fighting for.
Soon after the conflict in Lebanon developed into a total war (at
least in the eyes of the Israelis) it became clear to most Israeli
generals that the IDF doesn't have the means to address the rain of
Hezbollah Katyusha rockets. If the initial Israeli goal was to stop
the Katyusha rockets and to bring home the two captured Israeli
reserves, these goals proved to be beyond reach. The Israeli commander
soon learned that without proper and quality intelligence, their
superior firepower and technology lost any relevance. As funny as it
may sound, in a matter of a few days the Israeli leadership adopted
some post-structuralist vocabulary. Rather than providing the people
of Israel with a simple straightforward `victory' they all started to
communicate in terms of a `narrative of victory'. Days from the
launch of the Israeli campaign the Israeli military began to talk in
terms of `an Image of victory' rather than `victory' per se. Shimon
Peres started to use the term `perception' of a victory. Yet, even
`perception' and `image' of a victory proved to be far beyond reach.
The Only Democracy in the Middle East
As useless as the Israeli army proved to be, the Israeli government
wasn't any better. Ehud Olmert, the PM, the man who was voted to
`disengage' from Palestinian territories, had very little
understanding of military affairs. If this is not enough, Amir Peretz,
the Labour leader, the man whom Olmert appointed to be his Minister of
Defence, lacked any significant knowledge in defence matters as well.
For the first time in its history, Israel was led by two professional
politicians who had no military background. On the face of it, one may
expect that such a dramatic shift would curve the Israeli hawkish
tendency within the military and political realm. In practice, the
opposite happened. Both Peretz and Olmert found themselves dragged and
manipulated into a large-scale conflict by the bloodthirsty Chief of
Staff. Considering their inexperience and the short time that they had
been holding office, neither Olmert nor Peretz could come up with some
creative alternative solutions that might avoid conflict yet would
achieve something more. Rather than holding the Army back and giving
diplomacy a chance, they both let Halutz lead the country towards
unnecessary escalation. Without understanding the full picture, the
Israeli government ended up promising Halutz the necessary time and
support to achieve goals that were beyond reach to start with.
But the truth must be said. Olmert and Peretz were not alone in their
cabinet. In fact, they were surrounded by military analysts,
intelligence experts, ex-generals and security services veterans.
Olmert had in his government Reserved General Shaul Mofaz, the ex
Chief of Staff, a man who spent the late phase of his military career
fighting the Hezbollah. Avi Dichter, a Security Services veteran was
there to comment on the IDF operative suggestions. They had in the
government Benjamin Ben Eliezer as well, a reserve Brigadier who had
been an expert on Lebanese issues for the last three decades. Shimon
Peres was himself a Prime Minister and a Defence Minister in the past.
Reservist General Ami Ayalon, and ex-IDF General as well as a former
Chief of the Internal Security Services offered his help to Amir
Peretz. Yet, none of these experts managed to form a decision-making
body, none of the above managed to moderate the military enthusiasm of
Halutz, Olmert and Peretz. Like a leaf in the wind, the Israeli
government was manipulated by the Generals and later by the public
opinion that turned dramatically against the leadership and its
inadequate achievement.
As time went by, with military failure becoming public knowledge, the
more desperately Olmert, Peretz and Halutz tried to change the course
of the war just to save their future careers. Though they realised
that the chances of achieving a victory were melting down by the hour,
they were determined to present the public something that would look
like a victory or even simply as an achievement. This is apparently
what political survival in the Israeli democracy means for real, you
have to present something that may look like a victory. To call it a
name, Peretz, Halutz and Olmert ordered the Army to cause some real
devastation, assuming that this would gratify the Israeli voter. The
IAF and the artillery command reacted instantly, some heavy barrages
of cluster bombs, missiles and shells rained over southern Lebanon. In
the last 48 hours leading to the ceasefire, Israel emptied it entire
stock of weaponry. According to Shelah and Limor, Israel's ammunition
stocks reached the `red light' position.
In order to save the political careers of Olmert and Peretz, the IDF
launched more and more pointless risky operations with very limited
tactical value. These operations failed one after the other without
achieving a single thing. Yet they exposed the IDF's weaknesses. They
revealed an Army and a political leadership in a state of a panic.
Towards the final hours of the war, some isolated patches of Israeli
special units were stranded and starved along the southern Lebanese
front with no access to water and food. A few units of Hezbollah
warriors had managed to encircle top Israeli commandos. Seemingly, no
one in Israel dared to risk logistic convoys into the battlefield.
Food and ammunition that was dropped from cargo airplanes fell into
the hands of the Hezbollah. In some areas, the wounded IDF commandos
were lying on the ground, waiting many hours for rescue units. The
defeat was total. The humiliation was colossal. Not only was the
`Israeli Defence Army' unable to defend Israel anymore, it even failed
in defending itself.
Limor and Shelah expose many more interesting issues:
Brigadiers who failed to fight alongside their soldiers, instead they
preferred to run the battle from secluded bunkers inside Israel.
Helicopter gunships were not allowed to enter Lebanese air space just
to avoid the risk of being shot down, as a result, Israeli commandos
were left to fight Hezbollah on equal terms (lacking air support).
A Lieutenant Colonel who refused to lead his soldiers into Lebanon
admitted being deficient in operative tactical knowledge.
Reservist soldiers were heading towards the front with hardly any of
their combatant gear because of some severe shortage in the army
emergency stockrooms. Some of those reservists ended up spending their
own money so that they could buy the necessary gear.
More details regarding Dan Halutz's 12 July stock exchange affair.
Apparently, the Chief of Staff, General Halutz phoned up the bank and
ordered them to sell his investment portfolio soon after he learned
about the clashes in the north. All this happened just before he
himself ordered a further escalation.
Seemingly, the Israeli army is `all over the place', it is under
trained, it is heavy, it is messy, and its leaders are corrupted to
the bone. The Israeli political leadership isn't any better. Though
Peretz is no longer at the Ministry of Defence, Olmert, Mofaz, Dichter
and now Barak - all qualified mass murderers - are still cabinet
members. Considering the state of its army, Israel may have to
consider a swift change of direction, it cannot fight anymore. It
lacks the endurance. But seemingly this is not going to happen. As it
seems, in the next Israeli election we are probably going to see the
eloquent yet belligerent Benjamin Netanyahu fighting the belligerent
yet far less eloquent Ehud Barak.
For years we tended to believe that Israel would not be defeated in
the battlefield. Learning in detail the events of the last war allows
us to consider that this may not be the case. The Jewish state has
already been defeated in battle and this may happen again sooner than
we think.
[1] Captives in Lebanon, Ofer Shelah/Yaov Limor, Miskal, Yedioth
Ahrononth and Chemed Books, 2007 Pg 95.
[2] Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, a speech given at Bint Jabel after the
Israeli Evacuation.
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